Case 1:07-cr-01170-LAP Document 244 Filed 10/17/13 Page 1 of 47

D7f9cols1 Sentence UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 07 CR 1170 (LAP) V. 5 JOSEPH P. COLLINS, 6 Defendant. -----x 7 8 New York, N.Y. July 15, 2013 9 2:33 p.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. LORETTA A. PRESKA 12 District Judge 13 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 PREET BHARARA United States Attorney for the 16 Southern District of New York HARRY A. CHERNOFF 17 MICHAEL LEVY EDWARD IMPERATORE 18 Assistant United States Attorneys 19 COOLEY LLP Attorneys for Defendant 20 WILLIAM SCHWARTZ JONATHAN BACH 21 22 23 24 25

1 (In open court; case called) 2 THE COURT: United States against Joseph Collins. 3 Is the government ready? 4 MR. CHERNOFF: Yes. Harry Chernoff for the 5 government. With me at counsel table is AUSA Michael Levy, 6 AUSA Edward Imperatore, Postal Inspector Katherine Searles, and 7 Postal Inspector Edward Clark. Good afternoon. THE COURT: Good afternoon. 8 9 Is the defense ready? 10 MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, your Honor. William Schwartz for 11 Joseph Collins, together with Jonathan Bach. 12 THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Schwartz. 13 MR. CHERNOFF: I'm sorry, your Honor. I meant Robert 14 In my haste, I changed his first name. Clark. 15 THE COURT: I knew that. 16 MR. CHERNOFF: Sorry, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Schwartz, have you and your client had 18 adequate time to review the presentence report? 19 MR. SCHWARTZ: We have, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Is there any reason it should not be made 21 part of the record? 22 MR. SCHWARTZ: There is not, your Honor. 23 We've sent you the objections that we have, in 24 particular, objection to the presentence report relying on

Mr. Collins having somehow been involved in fraud involving a

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revolving loan, counts of which were dropped from the indictment.

THE COURT: Have you had a chance to confer with the government on this one?

MR. SCHWARTZ: We have not, your Honor. We have not conferred.

THE COURT: Is this something you want to be heard on now or are you asking for a modification of the report? What would you like?

MR. SCHWARTZ: I would ask that your Honor not rely on that part of the report and make that clear on the record.

THE COURT: Mr. Chernoff.

MR. CHERNOFF: Your Honor, we don't rely on that allegation so we have no problem with the defense suggestion.

THE COURT: Granted.

Are there other objections to the presentence report that you would like to be heard on?

MR. SCHWARTZ: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

With respect to the offense level computation, I accept the findings of the presentence report set forth at paragraphs 93 through 107 which conclude that a total offense level of 49 is appropriate.

With respect to the defendant's criminal history, I accept the findings of the presentence report set forth at

paragraphs 108 through 110 which conclude that a criminal history category of I is appropriate.

I have the defense sentencing memorandum, a very large package of defense letters, a smaller unbound package of defense letters, the government's sentencing memorandum, and the defense reply sentencing memorandum.

Are there any additional materials I should be looking at?

MR. CHERNOFF: No, your Honor.

MR. SCHWARTZ: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

Mr. Schwartz, would you like to speak on behalf of Mr. Collins.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Before you start, counsel, I'd like to thank you both for the most impressive sentencing materials.

They are probably some of the best — they are certainly some of the best I've ever seen. They might be the best.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Your Honor, I know it's often said by judges whom I have talked to and whom I know that the most difficult thing someone in your Honor's position has to do is to sentence someone. It's less often said, but equally true, that the most difficult thing someone in my position has to do is stand before the Court and urge upon the Court why the sentence should not be a severe one. And that's particularly

true in this case, your Honor.

No one can possibly know a defendant the way a criminal defense lawyer gets to know a defendant, particularly in a case like this that has stretched over so many years. I have seen Mr. Collins in circumstances that I would hope that none of us would ever have to go through. And, of course, in his case there is a particular empathy because we share a profession and I would say, your Honor, we share a love of that profession. I have spent thousands of hours with him and with his family not just learning the substance of the case but understanding the substance of the man. And what makes this sentence particularly difficult for me, and I think for Jonathan, is after representing him since October 2005, almost eight years, is our abiding belief in his innocence.

We've made, as your Honor has noted, a very extensive sentencing submission to the Court in which we give the Court an extended view of how we interpreted the jury's verdict and how we see the evidence in the case. And I'm not going to rehearse that here today again, your Honor. I'm not going to delve into the facts of the case except to say the following. It was clear to us watching this jury that this was not a simple verdict, an easy verdict for them to render. And whatever happened here, whatever their verdict means or doesn't mean, the one thing that I think is absolutely true in this case about a fraud where investors were defrauded of billions

of dollars, is that whatever it is the jury decided Joseph Collins did or did not do -- and I think in this case the words "did not do" are appropriate -- he did not act in any sense out of greed or self-interest. And immediately that puts this case on a different footing from almost any case I have ever been involved with. And I would dare say virtually any white collar case in which your Honor has rendered a sentence, particularly one involving a massive fraud.

There simply was no evidence that he either sought to or did benefit from the crime that was committed at Refco. It would not only be inconsistent with the evidence in this case to suggest to the contrary, your Honor, but it's inconsistent with the character of the man who has been presented to you in the 140-some-odd letters that we supplied to the Court.

It's inconsistence with the extraordinary way in which he has given away his money to causes that he has deemed worthy. Very often and mostly quietly. And inconsistent with the extraordinary good deeds that I'll talk a little more about.

This case, as your Honor can imagine, has had an enormous impact. And what I'm going to talk about is the man who, unfortunately, while we have tried to have your Honor get to know him as well as we do, I want to make sure that we convey the feelings we have about him.

This case has taken an enormous toll on his life. It

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was over six years ago when he was -- when we received a call from the United States Attorney's Office and were told that somebody whom we had perceived as a witness in their case had now become a target of the case. And he has managed those six years, despite the toll, to go through this with enormous equanimity, never bowing to the pressure, always moving forward.

His career is over. I think your Honor can tell from the letters from his family and the letters from his colleagues what the law and the practice of law meant to him and what he had achieved in the profession. That ended with his indictment in December 2007, as did his standing in the profession. to be recovered.

I think, your Honor, that that loss is far more significant to Joe Collins, from what I know of the man, than the loss of the earning power that went with that.

Now I also understand that in every case, as I have done in the past, and others, a lawyer stands here and says that the case is having an enormous impact on the man. What's extraordinary in this case is how Joe Collins reacted to the events that took place in his life and what that says about his character, both before and after Refco. It speaks volumes for who he is.

Your Honor has the letters from the Chicago Jesuit In December when Joe Collins took a leave of absence Academy.

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from Mayer Brown he resigned his partnership after his first conviction, December 2007, faced with time on his hands, something he had never had before. He knew how to fill it. And he volunteered that time to give it away in a most extraordinary way, in a way that has had an impact on the lives of many young people who have gone through that academy in the six years that he's been there three days a week. something that often defendants might do because they fear this day and they want to have something positive to say to the But I think that your Honor can tell from the other letters about Mr. Collins that that had nothing to do with it. In fact, Jonathan and I did not even know that Joe had done this until sometime after he began volunteering, which is also consistent with the quiet way in which he's led his life. that act, fill my time by giving to others even while I'm under the most immense personal pressure that can be imagined, is consistent with the way he's lived his entire life.

It's consistent with taking in a young, troubled high school student who was a friend of one of his sons, to save him in his senior year of high school by allowing him and helping him live in the Collins family when his home had fallen apart and to somehow manage to survive because of Joe Collins and move on to college and a career.

It is consistent with giving both money and time for an Eritrean refugee trying to find her place in the country and

not just letting it go with a few dollars towards her high school education but taking her under his wing as a mentor and having an impact that would change her life.

It's consistent with Joe Collins offering to be a foster parent for another friend of one of his sons when that friend's family, when there was a death in the family.

It's consistent with Joe Collins quietly paying for the funeral of a parent of one of his sons classmates, without telling even his wife, so that that woman who had lived a troubled life could be buried in dignity.

That's the Joe Collins that I know, your Honor.

That's the Joe Collins that volunteered to work at the Chicago

Jesuit Academy when he had time on his hands.

Now, there is no way to summarize in a few words what the letters say about him. One of the things that struck me over the weekend as I was rereading them was the repetition of certain words. I don't have them all, but here are some:

Humility, church, faith, generosity, giving, family, integrity, role model. 140 people who used those words over and over

Let me talk about his family. Joe Collins was a lawyer who sometimes billed up to 2500 hours a year. We all know what that is like. Hopefully we don't know it too often. But what does his family say, and friends of the family? He never missed a game of any of his sons. He never missed an

again whose lives have been changed.

event that was important to them. He never missed being there when they needed him to show him the way. He did not miss

Steve Lake's SATs when he felt it was required for him to sit outside so that Steve wouldn't run away. Joe Collins has given

You've seen the impact from their letters, and from the letters of his daughters-in-law, on his sons.

himself to his family in a way that is just extraordinary.

Your Honor, this sentencing takes place exactly at the time where he's able to begin to have the same kind of impact on his grandchildren, and we ask that your Honor consider that in passing sentence today.

You've heard from his wife of 40 years, his childhood sweetheart, about this extraordinary relationship. And Mary Pat has been here through two trials and stood by Joe every inch of the way. And that relationship is a testament not just to Mary Pat but to Joseph Collins and what he inspires in people.

We who are parents can only hope that some day we can hear the things from our children said about us that Joseph Collins' children have said about him.

You've heard, your Honor, from his colleagues at the bar, both his adversaries and his cocounsel. And one of the words that pops out of all of their letters is integrity. He was perceived by the people that he worked with day in and day out as being a lawyer of the highest -- not only skill but

integrity.

We've heard from his partners -- and what often happens in these cases, your Honor, there is no reason -- of course, someone might argue there are legal interests that are aligned, but there is no reason for the partners to have said what they have said about him other than from the deepest of feelings. Mayer Brown faces crippling lawsuits as a result of Refco. Are his partners bitter? His partners are anything but bitter. They are supportive in the most deep personal way. And that, your Honor, is because Joe Collins touched them through his many years of partnership the way he touched us through the years that we represented him.

Those partners, including two former assistant U.S. attorneys, one of whom, like I, was privileged to serve in this office, those partners say only the most extraordinary things about him. As do his friends. Whether it's going back to childhood or to the incredible relationships that he made at college, including with a friend of mine, Ted Wells. They all have come forward to talk about Joe and what their perception of Joe was as a leader in the college, as someone who, even at the time, was clear that he — he felt that there was service to be done in a college that emphasized service. And, your Honor, as someone who went to college at the same time as Joe, I can tell you that putting on the uniform of the United States military was not an easy thing to do when Joe was in college.

And I've read a little bit about Holy Cross during that period. It was not an easy thing to do there. And Joe Collins proudly served his country in the ROTC and then later proudly served his country as a captain in the Air Force because service is in every fiber of his being.

Generosity. The statistics that were provided to the Court about Joe's giving are also extraordinary. Always approaching, sometimes exceeding ten percent of his after-tax income. That is simply amazing. But that was simply to pay back institutions that had helped him along the way, institutions that he felt were helping others and touching others. But it didn't stop there.

Every spare moment of Joe Collins' life has been filled with service. Service to those less fortunate than he is. I think Steve Lake has an extraordinary letter in which he says at the end — this is the young man whom he took into his house at the most desperate time of his life, and he uses the word generosity. "Put simply, without Mr. Collins' extreme generosity and inspiring example I would not be where I am today. Indeed, I do not know where I would be."

That's just Joe.

Or the boy, David, at Chicago Jesuit Academy, again, somebody that Joe would not have told us about had they not written their letters. Joe didn't tell us about any of those things. It's only -- because he doesn't do that. It's only

through our conversations with Mary Pat that we were able to learn some of this.

The boy David, a troubled fifth grader. His uncle had recently committed suicide, come from the same difficult neighborhood on the west side of Chicago that the school is located in that Joe has to drive an hour-and-a-half to get to and is the site — the area of many violent crimes, including murders. The timing of Joe's assistance to this young boy, David, is unbelievable. It was right before, right during, and right after his trial in this courtroom. And as the letters attest, he has had impact on David that none of the other 45 volunteers in that school have ever had.

But Joe is also the kind of person who doesn't insist, I'm here, I want to tutor, I want to council. As your Honor has seen from those letters, he performs janitorial duties.

Whatever is needed, Joe Collins is there, without complaint — in fact, not only without complaint, with pride to do, to make the world a better place.

You know I know him well enough to know -- although we have never discussed this -- many of the letters talk about him as a man of faith and a deeply, deeply devout catholic. That I have seen. And I know him well enough to know that he quietly, to himself, believes that these good works are some day going to be taken into account by another judge on another day. And I also know Joe well enough to know that he does not in any way

presume to guess how they will be weighted in that judgment.

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But your Honor I've represented him in this world.

And your Honor has to judge him in this world. If ever there was a moment for someone's life and good acts to be taken into account in this world, it's on this judgment day. We ask the Court to please sentence Joe Collins to a noncustodial sentence.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Schwartz.

Mr. Collins, would you like to speak on your own behalf.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, sir. Would you do it now, please.

THE DEFENDANT: I would like to thank my friends and my family, especially my wife, for all the support and prayers they have provided during this ordeal.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Does the government wish to be heard?

MR. CHERNOFF: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. CHERNOFF: Your Honor, I just want to comment briefly on a couple points that were made in the defense papers and also in the presentation here this afternoon.

The question of Mr. Collins' motivation has been squarely litigated in the context of the sentencing and also before the jury. And the assertion that Mr. Collins did not

benefit from having Refco as his most important client, the client that resulted in favorable compensation calculations. We walked through before this jury, and as set forward in the trial transcript, all the formulas that the firm used in compensating him and all the hours that were billed by Mr. Collins and by other lawyers at his firm to Refco. It's clear that his financial incentive was not as great as some of the people who were also convicted of these crimes. But it is hard to imagine how one could conclude that he had no incentive to do all of this work for all of this time and not just the work that resulted in the charged offenses but all of the other work from Refco that came with it and that Mr. Collins benefited from and that his firm benefited from year after year.

We've heard a lot of negative things, understandably, expressed by the defense at trial and sentencing about the more responsible perpetrators at Refco: Mr. Bennett, Mr. Trosten, Mr. Maggio, Mr. Grant. But these were Joseph Collins' clients. Those were the men, this was the company that was his primary client, his primary focus over the many years that he worked for Refco and over the many years that he committed these crimes. This wasn't an aberrational act. This was something that occurred year after year.

It's been suggested that the jury may have concluded that Mr. Collins' failure to disclose the PPA was alone what he

did wrong here. And your Honor will recall that the way the government presented that argument at the first trial was squarely debated in this trial in the context of the jury charge. And the government never argued the case to this jury, never argued that the PPA alone was the problem here, that it was simply a difference of view as to whether something needed to be disclosed, perhaps an honest disagreement among lawyers.

This is how the defense has tried to interpret the jury verdict. And yet, the Court will ultimately decide what the offense conduct was here by the preponderance standard. And we have overwhelmingly presented the case, far surpassed the standard, calling witness after witness that showed that Joseph Collins could not have been ignorant of the hole; not only because of direct conversations but because of documents he worked on with lawyers like Earl Melamed involving the buyouts of Mr. Grant, Mr. Dittmer, that showed that there had to be this kind of a hole or else the relatively small amount of money that they were taking out of the deal could not be explained.

Joseph Collins knew this company well enough to know that the hole existed from the documents he worked on, from the conversations he had, and that was why he laid down a line in disclosing the PPA, and fought with the other lawyers from BAWAG who wanted to disclose it -- who thought it should be disclosed.

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Your Honor, at sentencing it is difficult for all of us to participate in the process to see a lengthy sentence imposed on the defendant whose family and friends are in the This is a crime, though, where -- and I should note so the Court knows from prior correspondence, we have updated victims about this case and about these proceedings with our web-based notification procedures. This is a case where the victims number in the thousands and the losses number in the billions. And if the victims actually did come to court we couldn't do it in this courthouse. We did call a couple of victims at trial as sort of illustrative examples. Your Honor will recall the money that was lost by the pension fund TIAA-CREF, Mr. Schaub an individual investor who lost thousands of dollars of his own money investing in Refco. And I can imagine how dispirited and how pessimistic and maybe how cynical some of the investors in this company must feel after the many years that it has taken to bring all the defendants to justice, to bring Mr. Collins to this point.

And I would suggest, as we've argued in our papers, that that pessimism, the cynicism is extremely strong here because Mr. Collins is an attorney, because, as the Court has determined in adopting the probation office's recommendation with respect to use of a special skill, he employed his skills as an attorney, as an attorney for an extremely prestigious firm, a man with tremendous professional accomplishments, and

he employed those skills to deceive others and to steal from the victims in this case.

The lies that Mr. Collins engaged in in this case are not just limited to the indictment. They are limited to his prior testimony. And the defense suggests that because Judge Patterson imposed obstruction on a different point than the government had advanced, that he somehow decided that none of the other points merited obstruction. And I would suggest that the Court just didn't reach those points because the judge, Judge Patterson, had made a finding with respect to this more narrow point, which the defense is correct, we're not relying on.

Mr. Collins, in the first trial, took the stand -- and was on the stand I think for five days, between direct and cross-examination -- and denied every aspect of the charges, denied knowing about the hole, called the government's witnesses liars. I think for a whole bunch of reasons he decided to handle this trial differently. But that doesn't mean that his attempt to obstruct justice in the first trial can be put aside.

I think, although none of us were there at the first trial -- I mean at the prosecution table and your Honor -- to observe Mr. Collins' demeanor, we saw some of that in the hour or so of civil deposition testimony that followed that obstruction enhancement, the imposition of it, in which

Mr. Collins continued his obstructive conduct. 1 2 MR. SCHWARTZ: Preceded. 3 MR. CHERNOFF: Sorry. 4 And so for that reason when we look at the prior trial 5 testimony which we submitted to your Honor and consider the 6 defendant's testimony under oath with regard to these matters 7 we would ask that the Court consider imposing the obstruction enhancement and increasing the guidelines level from 49 to 51. 8 9 THE COURT: I think I've already ruled because I made 10 the finding, didn't I? There was no obstruction enhancement in 11 the presentence report, and for that reason I did not -- not 12 for that reason, but I certainly did not impose one. 13 MR. CHERNOFF: Understood, your Honor. 14 I didn't know if the Court had made --15 THE COURT: Yes, sir. MR. CHERNOFF: If I could just have a moment? 16 17 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 18 (Pause) MR. CHERNOFF: Mr. Levy just points out I'm not sure 19 20 that the more recent PSR recited this language. In the PSR 21 from the first trial, the probation office said it would defer 22 the finding to the Court, as is their practice. That language 23 I don't think was in the more recent PSR, and I guess I just

THE COURT: I actually thought it was. At paragraph

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didn't know --

102, "there was no enhancement imposed."

MR. CHERNOFF: Yes, your Honor.

So we thought that that was the probation office again deferring to the Court. But I understand your Honor's ruling.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. CHERNOFF: And so in light of the defendant's conduct, his use of a special skill, sophisticated nature of this scheme, the duration that it occurred over, the sheer number of victims and loss, the need to deter this kind of conduct among all actors in the capital markets but particularly corporate lawyers, the government requests that your Honor impose a substantial term of imprisonment.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Schwartz, do you wish to comment further?

MR. SCHWARTZ: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well. Then counsel I think it's clear by now that I have calculated the guidelines that are applicable and certainly take them into account.

With respect to the paragraph 3553(a) factors, looking first at the nature and circumstances of the offense. As we have discussed, the guidelines calculations here are technically correct. They result in a guidelines range that is several notches below the bottom of the guidelines chart, indicating a life sentence or 95 years if one considers the

statutory maximums.

Such a prescription illustrates, "the harm that guideline calculations can visit on human beings if not cabined by common sense." United States v. Adelson, 44 is F.Supp. 2d 506, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record).

There is no doubt that the offenses of conviction here were serious offenses in which major businesses and banks and untold thousands of investors lost millions and millions of dollars. Certainly Mr. Collins' role in the Refco fraud was an indispensable role, that of preparing legal documents over years for the transactions planned by company insiders to effect the fraud.

Although critical, however, Mr. Collins' role was of a different magnitude and clearly less culpable than that of the other defendants. Unlike those defendants, Mr. Collins did not devise, plan, or initiate any aspect of the fraud.

While that fact is probably not unheard of in fraud cases, what takes this case far outside the heartland of fraud cases, and particularly fraud cases involving lawyers, is that Mr. Collins did not personally receive or even attempt to receive any profit from the fraud. His lack of any intended or actual personal gain from the fraud distinguishes him from the other Refco defendants and from most other white collar

offenders in this district.

It is undisputed that Mr. Collins' only income during the period of the charged conspiracy was his law firm partnership income. I certainly acknowledge the government's point that without a client such as Refco that income might well have been less, probably would have been. However, the income he did receive was consistent with the income partners — other partners earned at similar types of law firms and other than the general presence of the Refco client there is no evidence that the amount of his partnership share from the firm was dependent directly on fees from Refco. In contrast, the other Refco defendants ranged from Mr. Bennett who stood to make one billion dollars down to Mr. Maggio who made a mere \$20 million. Accordingly, I find that the total offense level far overstates the nature and circumstances of the offense.

With respect to the history and characteristics of the defendant, it can fairly be said that but for this matter Mr. Collins is a certifiable saint. I echo Judge Rakoff's recognition of Mr. Gupta's prior good works in saying that I have "Never encountered a defendant whose prior history suggests such extraordinary devotion, not just to humanity but to individual human beings in their time of need." And I say that having been here over 20 years. And unlike so many of the defendants we see, Mr. Collins has worked for his church, his

family, his schools, and numerous other deserving organizations that work to better individuals' lives for decades. This was not a postarrest conversion. Far from it. As counsel stated this afternoon, every spare moment of his life has been filled with service to his family, his country, his church, his schools, and other deserving organizations.

As Mr. Collins' brother Austin writes, "Joe not only takes his religion seriously, he lives it in the best and most productive way possible. Joe walks the talk."

Mr. Collins has been a generous donor to charitable causes. I note, as counsel has, that during the period of the charged conspiracy his charitable giving approached or exceeded ten percent of his after-tax income. His generosity, however, has extended far beyond institutional giving. Over many years he has repeatedly and continuously given of his own time and energy in bringing about tangible change in the lives of others.

We know, for example, that Mr. Collins took in his sister and her two young children to his home following her divorce. The letters of both children make it clear that they regard Mr. Collins as a parents.

As counsel has noted, he also took into his home

Stephen Lake, a Loyola classmate of his son. Stephen's mother

was an alcoholic and incapable of caring for him. And but for

Mr. Collins, Stephen would have become a ward of the state and

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had to leave Loyola in his senior year. Stephen was a troubled young man and needless to say the experience was challenging for the Collins family. But, for Stephen Lake it was transformative. He writes, "Almost immediately I went from living in an environment of fear and abuse to living in a warm and loving home. Mr. Collins provided for my care and support, a selfless and heroic act in and I've itself. He also provided me with the kind of role model I'd never had; knowing him changed the entire trajectory of my life."

Stephen became a member of the Collins family, doing his chores and participating in family events. Mr. Collins mentored him in his studies, helped him to prepare for his SATs and helped him look at colleges. Stephen eventually completed college and is now a successful young man working with the Chicago Board of Trade. He writes, "Mr. Collins taught me how to treat others. First and foremost, the way he and Mrs. Collins treated me was remarkable. The way Mr. Collins treated others also made an impression on me. Although he was a successful lawyer, he would accord everyone the same dignity and respect. Most importantly, coming as I did from a broken and dysfunctional home, Mr. Collins showed me what a true family man looked like. Put simply, without Mr. Collins' extreme generosity and inspiring example, I would not be where Indeed, I don't know where I would be." I am todav.

Mr. Collins has long been an active participant in

LINK Unlimited, an educational sponsorship program serving economically disadvantaged African-American youth in Chicago. Through that program Mr. Collins made a commitment to contribute to costs of private secondary education for Azmera Berhe, who, with her family, was a refugee from civil war in Eritrea. Just as importantly as school, however, Mr. Collins came to know Azmera's entire family. She writes, "Joseph not only mentored me but I became almost like a daughter and truly felt they incorporated me into their family. I was included and welcomed with open arms in many family occasions such as Thanksgiving, Christmas and weddings. Joseph came to my home. He met my family. We shared meals of Eritrean food. He greatly admired my parents. Joseph introduced me to a life where hard work, passion, and dedication were what determines success in life rather than being a victim of circumstance."

Although Collins' obligations under LINK Unlimited ended when Azmera started college, he continued to support her and advise her and assist when she could not afford tuition. The first package she received when she went to college was from the Collins family and contained a new laptop. She has since graduated from the University of Illinois with a degree in community health.

Similarly, the Collinses have been active supporters of Boys Hope/Girls Hope of Chicago, a scholarship program serving at-risk children from Chicago's poorest neighborhoods.

The Collinses' son Christopher introduced them to Boys
Hope/Girls Hope when he spent a year working there as a house
parent. Mrs. Collins serves as an unpaid program coordinator
and a mentor and tutor to students. And Mr. Collins has not
only supported the program financially but has given his time
to mentoring graduates.

Patrick's Hughes, executive director of Boys

Hope/Girls Hope writes that Mr. and Mrs. Collins are "the kind of support you can count on to help our scholars when they need it most."

Like the defendant in United States v. Adelson,
Mr. Collins' "good deeds were not performed to gain status or
enhance his image." As in Adelson, "most were unknown to all
but a few people until the time of his sentencing." This is in
stark contrast to many of the white collar defendants we see in
this Court who put their names on fancy buildings, which of
course is a very worthy cause, but it brings with it a certain
enhanced status. That was not the path which Mr. Collins has
followed for all of these years. The example that's already
been noted by counsel was that Mr. Collins paid for the funeral
of the mother of one of the Collinses' sons' classmates,
because the family could not pay for the funeral. Until the
pastor mentioned it, Mrs. Collins didn't know he had done that.

the College of Holy Cross and New York University, both of which he attended, Dominican College, Notre Dame University, and Loyola Academy, the last of which his sons attended.

As counsel has also noted, following his indictment Mr. Collins remained true to form. Of course, he left the practice of law and since then has devoted his time to his family and the service of his community. Since January 2008, the month following his indictment, Mr. Collins has worked three days a week as a volunteer and tutor at Chicago Jesuit Academy, a full scholarship middle school located in a rough neighborhood on Chicago's West Side. Nearly all of the school students come from minority, single-parent families and almost all live at or below the poverty line. When he is not actively tutoring students, Mr. Collins willingly turns his hand to office work, sweeping up, organizing supplies, or whatever else might assist the school in performing its valuable mission.

Matthew Lynch, the school's president, describes

Mr. Collins as "One of our most reliable volunteers and

effective tutors. Joe is unfailingly kind, self-effacing and

generous. He graciously does whatever job needs doing. Given

the modest resources of our school, that means Joe's jobs vary

from cleaning up messes to tedious filing work, to the critical

work of tutoring a child in need. For over six years Joe has

done it all quietly, thoughtfully, and extremely well."

Mr. Lynch also points out that there are far easier

and more comfortable opportunities open to Mr. Collins and said, "We are far from his home and we're in a neighborhood that most Chicagoans do their best to avoid. The neighborhood that surrounds our school struggles under the weight of material poverty, gangs, drugs, and violence. While Joe has been a volunteer, we've had a volunteer mugged while walking to our building at 9:00 a.m. In October 2011 two people were shot an killed within a block of the school while school was in session. Two of our students, who are brothers, lost their biological father when he was shot less than four blocks from our school. There are safer places to volunteer but Joe believes in what we do and wants to help despite the risks."

As counsel has noted, Mr. Collins had notable success with a particularly troubled CJA student whom he had regularly counseled on a one-to-one basis for some months, leading up to and since the recent trial. Clara Chu, volunteer coordinator for CJA, describes the change that Mr. Collins' patience and compassion have brought about for this child. "For one particular fifth grader this year..." who she calls David but isn't his real name "...this additional assistance has made a remarkable difference in his success. For background, David's uncle, a relative he considered close, committed suicide in the summer of 2012 just before David was to begin his time at CJA. The fall quarter was, needless to say, a difficult transition. David made threats of self-harm, was admitted to a psychiatric

center for children for three weeks, and even when he returned in November showed signs of depression and need for high levels of attention. Mr. Collins has been our reliable go-to volunteer to help this young man obtain the attention he needs with care and compassion. Mr. Collins has helped David in a way that none of our other 45 volunteers has been able to. It has been remarkable to watch them develop an understanding and David knows that he can count on Mr. Collins. Whether helping to lead a seventh grade field trip, preparing senior students for their high school scholarship interviews, tutoring students like David, or handling janitorial or administrative tasks, Joseph Collins is an invaluable asset, our most dependable volunteer, and an integral part of our school community."

In reviewing in my mind the letters, I do note what counsel noted, that certain words appear continuously throughout a hundred something letters: Humility, church, generosity, giving, integrity, role model. Thus, in considering Mr. Collins' history and characteristics, I find his lifelong good works and charity to be extraordinary.

With respect to the seriousness of the offense. As I noted above, this was indeed a serious offense imposing financial losses on businesses and individuals of hundreds of millions of dollars and, as the government points out in its submission, raising doubts about the integrity of the capital market system.

As noted above, however, the certain nature and circumstance of this defendant's offense are outside the heartland of these types of serious offenses because of his secondary role and because of the lack of any direct financial gain.

As the government has pointed out, deterrence is indeed a very important consideration in any sentencing but particularly in white collar sentencings. I can say with great certainty, based on his past history, that there is no need for incarceration to protect the public from future crimes from this defendant.

General deterrence, however, is also a very important consideration in these cases. In considering the need for incarceration for general deterrence, I adopt Judge Rakoff's sentiment in the Gupta case that, "Common sense suggests that most business executives fear even a modest prison term to a degree that more hardened types might not. Thus, a modest prison term should be sufficient but not more than necessary for this purpose."

In United States v. Kipnis, No. 05 CR 727 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2007), the Court noted that, "for a lawyer who is not motivated by personal gain, the collateral consequences of conviction provided general deterrence."

In addressing the defendant, the Kipnis Court noted, "In looking at all that you have lost from where you were in

life, I think that is a significant deterrent to others who are thinking about engaging in a fraud the way that you have done so, by drafting documents and not receiving a penny and helping others to get money."

See also Adelson, 441 F.Supp. 2d at 514. "There is considerable evidence that even relatively short sentences can have a strong deterrent effect on prospective white collar offenders."

Here, Mr. Collins has lost his law license and his considerable standing in the legal community. To illustrate the very long fall from grace, I note the letter of Hector Gonzalez, formerly an Assistant United States Attorney in this district and a former Mayer Brown partner, as he sums up the partners' view of Mr. Collins. "Joe is, simply put, a good man. During the more than twelve years that I've known Joe, I never had a reason to call into question the settings on his moral compass. Joe has never given me the slightest reason to question his integrity. It is also fair to say that I am not alone in holding that opinion. At Mayer Brown, Joe had a reputation for honesty, integrity, and fair play, among both lawyers and stuff."

Similarly, Vincent Connelly, a former Assistant United
States Attorney in Chicago where he was chief of special
prosecutions is a senior partner at Mayer Brown who worked
closely with Mr. Collins on Refco litigation matters. He

describes work on a "bet the ranch" trial for Refco during which he consulted Mr. Collins throughout. He found that Mr. Collins consistently offered only ethical and responsible advice. "Never did he seek even a borderline advantage for the client if it wasn't well within appropriate boundaries of proper advocacy."

Mr. Connelly observes, "Prior to working at Mayer Brown I was a federal prosecutor in Chicago for ten years. I don't think that experience provides me with any special insight into human nature. But along with the following 25 years as a white collar criminal defense practitioner, it at least affords me a filter to observe lawyers who try to do the right thing and those who don't. Throughout the hundreds of times Joe and I had to make decisions and plan a course of action, he always was guided by doing what was proper and aboveboard."

Along with losing his standing in the legal community, Mr. Collins has also lost his ability to make a living. He also faces a civil lawsuit that threatens to bankrupt him and his family. His future earning power has been destroyed as he and his wife enter their mid 60s with no income and probably no assets. Thus, I conclude that in this case a lengthy prison sentence is not necessary for general deterrence of similarly situated individuals tempted to commit similar crimes particularly in light of the collateral consequences suffered

by Mr. Collins.

The paragraph (d) factors of providing education or vocational training are not relevant here.

I've taken into account the paragraph 3, 4, and 5 factors.

With respect to paragraph 6, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. I acknowledge the serious sentences received by the Refco insiders in this case;

Mr. Bennett was sentenced to 16 years and Mr. Grant to 10 years. As we know, Mr. Maggio has passed away and Mr. Trosten has not been sentenced.

Of course I am to look not only to the defendants in this case but to similar cases around the country. In doing so, I am persuaded that there will be no perceived disparity between the sentence given to Mr. Collins and the sentences received by other similarly situated white collar defendants.

I've already made reference to United States v. Kipnis and I look also to United States v. Graham, No. 06 CR 137 (D. Conn. April 30, 2009) where the defendant lawyer was said to have drafted the contracts to document the sham transactions in a fraud case and then to have hidden evidence from the auditors and the regulators. He was convicted of all 16 counts charged. As here, the guidelines called for life in prison. But judge Droney emphasized, "an important factor here that is different from so many other corporate fraud prosecution's is that

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Mr. Graham did not personally gain in a direct way from his criminal conduct and his motivation was not one of obtaining direct personal gain." Judge Droney also noted that Graham, "Did not have as active or central a role as other participants."

The Court's been pointed to other white collar sentencings in this district, Mr. Ebbers and others. of these cases, those defendants were the business people who not only planned, devised and initiated the fraud but enjoyed enormous financial gains from those frauds. The case of Donna Guerin is said to be a "reasonably close analogy" to this one. She was an attorney recently sentenced for her sales of fraudulent tax shelters in United States v. Daugerdas. analogy, however, is poor. As Judge Pauley noted at sentencing Ms. Guerin's motivation was her "lust for money" and she sought and received "stunning multimillion dollar compensation for her crimes. "As Judge Pauley stated at sentencing, "For Ms. Guerin, it apparently has always been about the money. Even with all the money she amassed, there is not a single letter submitted to the Court on her behalf showing any meaningful commitment to public service or charity beyond her college sorority that encompassed activities like driving an elderly alumna to a reunion celebration. In short, there are very few mitigating circumstances here, just unchecked avarice. It is against that backdrop that the Court is prepared to impose sentence on

Ms. Guerin at this time."

Judge Pauley's sentencing remarks in Guerin emphasize the distinctions between Mr. Collins and the heartland of fraud defendants in his lack of personal gain, his limited role, and his enormous and continuing prior charitable works.

Finally, as to restitution. The government does not seek restitution here because of the overwhelming difficulty in locating victims and calculating loss.

Taking all of those factors into account, counsel, it is my intention to impose a sentence of incarceration of a year and a day, followed by a period of two years of supervised release.

It is my intention to impose only the special condition of providing the probation officer with access to any requested financial information.

It is not my intention to impose a fine.

As I mentioned, restitution and forfeiture are not sought here.

It is my intention to impose the mandatory \$700 special assessment and to delete the drug testing requirement.

Is there any reason, counsel, such a sentence should not be imposed?

MR. CHERNOFF: No, your Honor.

MR. SCHWARTZ: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

Mr. Collins, you're sentenced, sir, to a period of a year and a day incarceration. Following that time you'll spend a period of two years on supervised release. During that period you'll comply with all of the standard terms and conditions of supervised release. Among them are that you not commit another federal, state, or local crime; you not illegally possess a controlled substance; and you not possess a firearm or other destructive device. In addition to those and all of the other standard terms and conditions of supervised release, you will also provide the probation officer with access to any requested financial information. In light of the lack of any substance abuse history, the drug testing requirement is deleted.

And finally, sir, I must impose and do impose the mandatory \$700 special assessment and that should be paid promptly.

It is my duty to inform you, sir, that unless you've waived it, you have the right to appeal this sentence and you might have the right to appeal in forma pauperis, as a poor person, with the waiver of certain fees and expenses.

Mr. Schwartz.

MR. SCHWARTZ: May I have a second, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

(Pause)

MR. SCHWARTZ: We would request that your Honor grant

bail in this case pending appeal. I'm prepared to make an argument if your Honor wants me to be heard at this time.

THE COURT: Does the government oppose bail pending appeal?

MR. CHERNOFF: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Schwartz.

MR. SCHWARTZ: First, your Honor, I'll just note as background that by the time the appeal gets heard in this case and decided Mr. Collins may well have served his entire sentence. If he gets a year and a day and fifteen percent off for good time, he will be out in less than a year. Given the amount of time that the last appeal took and in a similar case which your Honor is aware that I had where there was a sentence of a year and a day, I believe he will have finished his sentence.

There are -- as your Honor notes, the standard -- obviously, I take it I don't need to address whether

Mr. Collins is a danger to the community.

THE COURT: You can move on, Mr. Schwartz.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Your Honor, we have a couple of issues on appeal that I think present substantial issues for the Second Circuit, even though I know, given this Court's prior rulings, you might disagree. But your Honor is also aware that whether you agree or not is not determinative of whether the issue is substantial.

First, having to do with the Court's charge of conscious avoidance. Two different judges have heard this trial and one decided to give that charge, your Honor, and the other didn't. We think that on its face raises on the same facts the question of whether the charge was properly given.

I will note that conscious avoidance was clearly in the forefront of the jury's mind as they deliberated.

One of their last -- it may have even been their last note prior to verdict raised three different questions surrounding conscious avoidance, whether I think -- I think it was whether Mr. Collins -- an overt act could be conscious avoidance, whether they could consider conscious avoidance -- whether you could have agreed to have been in a conspiracy through conscious avoidance, and whether conscious avoidance could be considered for intent as well as for knowledge.

So clearly there were at least some jurors who were inclined to see this as a conscious avoidance case. And what makes this case, we think, not a conscious avoidance case. I think, respectfully, where the Court erred, is that what Mr. Collins is stated to have done and what the government argued in the charging conferences is to have not done; in other words, to have been aware of a number of facts that should have led him to conclude a crime was committed but then not asked questions. So the affirmative act that's required — conscious avoidance requires; one, that you have a knowledge of

such -- a sufficient enough knowledge so that you can be presumed to know that there's something that's very wrong and then to take an act to avoid finding things out.

And I think what the government argued to the Court was that essentially Mr. Collins didn't ask questions when he could have asked questions. So we think that the charge was not properly given.

But even if your Honor was correct in charging the jury on conscious avoidance, we asked at the time that your Honor charge the jury on the issue that -- charge the jury that conscious avoidance is not recklessness.

And the Supreme Court has spoken to the issue of recklessness in conscious avoidance in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A at 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2011. Your Honor, I do not have the U.S. citation yet.

(Continued on next page)

MR. SCHWARTZ: But, I think what the Court says here is pretty dramatic, and it's why we believe a conscious avoidance is not reckless charge should have been given.

It says that conscious avoidance charge has two basic requirements. They call it willful blindness --

THE COURT: Slowly. Slowly.

MR. SCHWARTZ: The Court refers to willful blindness, but I think it's what we call conscious avoidance.

The requirements are that the defendant must subjectively believe there is a high probability that a fact exists; and two, the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning that fact.

Again, quoting from the Court: We think these requirements give willful blindness an appropriately limiting scope that surpasses recklessness and negligence. Under this formulation, a willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts. By contrast, a reckless defendant is one who merely knows of a substantial and unjustified risk of such wrongdoing. And a negligent defendant is one who should have known of a similar risk.

We think given that standard and given what the case was about, which were facts from which one could argue did he know or did he not or was it merely a substantial probability,

that the jury should have been told recklessness is not enough.

And it would have enabled the defense, your Honor, in

summation, to really point out and go into the facts as being

possible recklessness, but not a conscious avoidance.

Something I had to avoid doing, given the Court's charge.

If the Second Circuit agrees with us, that -- your Honor did charge it was not negligence, but if they agree it was not negligence and it was not recklessness, then the entire conviction will be reversed, so we've also satisfied that element.

In addition, your Honor, given the conscious avoidance charge, and the importance of that charge to the jury's deliberation -- and I'll remind the Court, I believe the last thing that Mr. Chernoff did in his rebuttal summation was read the charge to the jury, the Court's charge on conscious avoidance, which was a very powerful thing to do given the circumstances in this case.

We believe that we should have been permitted to call an expert to place into context what a lawyer does and what the kinds of facts are that are available to a lawyer in the normal practice of law, so that the jury could have determined whether those facts had relevance with respect to what we think was its determination that Mr. Collins consciously avoided, and didn't ask questions that he probably properly should have asked.

And in our proffer to the Court, we had set forth the

kinds of things that we think would go, for example, if the jury were to have decided -- and as you know from our submission, I don't believe this is where the case was decided -- but if they were to have decided the case on the failure to ask questions about the back-to-back loans, they would have been told by an expert that a lawyer isn't always privy to every document in a transaction, and not always privy to why a client does something. That would have been something that would have helped them to evaluate conscious avoidance.

Finally, your Honor, we respectfully suggest that we believe that the Court erred in not permitting the expert to testify with respect to the facts and circumstances surrounding the materiality of the proceeds participation agreement, and to have given his opinion that the PPA would not have significantly altered the mix of information available to investors in a way that was material. Whether that would have ultimately been couched in use of the word, what use of the world "material" or not is something we didn't get to litigate. And we had proposed different alternatives to the Court.

But the fact is that materiality, as we argued during the trial, for all the counts in which Mr. Collins was convicted, is an element. And is an element that must be objectively determined. And that it would have been useful to the jury to have heard how a lawyer, who was engaged in transactions such as this for his entire career, our proffered

expert, would have interpreted the facts and circumstances surrounding the proceeds participation agreement.

So, on that ground as well, your Honor, we think there is a substantial issue about which I'm sure your Honor does not agree with the conclusion that we reach, but the Second Circuit may well, in which this conviction could be reversed. And we ask your Honor to grant Mr. Collins bail pending a determination.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Levy.

MR. LEVY: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, if I could first take up the issue of the length of Mr. Collins' sentence. It is, as your Honor is aware, not a part of the standard under Section 3143 whether or not the defendant may have served his sentence by the time the appeal has run. The standard is relatively simple. The defendant needs to show that he's not a risk of flight, and I think it's fair to say that the government is not contending that he is. And then he also needs to show that the appeal raises a substantial question of law. So the issue of whether or not his sentence is going to run by the end is really not a part of the analysis.

Let me address in reverse order the points that the defense counsel has made. The issue of the expert is really not a substantial question of law by any stretch of the imagination. That is a discretionary decision of your Honor.

It was a decision that was made correctly. It is understood that the defense disagrees with the decision, but the possibility that the Second Circuit is going to conclude that your Honor abused her discretion by determining that an expert in matters of legal practice was unnecessary and should be precluded in this case is really not a realistic possibility. The Second Circuit — I think it would be difficult to find a decision in which the Second Circuit has done something like that.

Moving to conscious avoidance. Although on the surface it presents an issue that is somewhat meatier, the Second Circuit has in recent weeks reached what is essentially everything that the defendant proposes to make the basis for the appeal.

With respect to whether or not a conscious avoidance instruction in this case was appropriate at all, the Second Circuit very recently said in <u>United States v. Cuti</u>, C-U-T-I. It is a published opinion, but it is recent enough that I don't think it has a full citation yet. It's 2013 WL 3197796. And in that case, the Second Circuit said that the District Court did not err in giving a conscious avoidance instruction. And specifically it said that the defendant's purported lack of knowledge defense, despite the defendant's deep involvement in the transactions that effectuated the fraud, all but invited the conscious avoidance charge.

It is identical here. This defendant claimed that he was unaware of the nature of the transactions that he personally participated in. And the Second Circuit has just recently said that invites a conscious avoidance instruction. So there is no substantial issue there.

As for Global-Tech --

THE COURT: I was going to ask you whether that Court gave the it is not recklessness charge.

MR. LEVY: I don't know. I don't believe that came up in <u>Cuti</u>. But, also within the last couple of weeks in <u>United</u>

<u>States v. Goffer</u>, G-O-F-F-E-R, also published but also too recent to have a F.3d citation, it's 2013 WL 3285115. The

Second Circuit addressed this issue of whether an anti-recklessness language needs to be included in a conscious avoidance instruction. They said it did not. The language from this opinion: Kimmelman urges us to believe -- I'm sorry.

Kimmelman alleges that the District Court erred in declining to amend its jury instructions to accord with the Supreme Court's ruling in Global-Tech. Specifically, Kimmelman contends that the Global-Tech decision required the jury charges indicate that, quote, the mental state of recklessness is insufficient for a finding of conscious avoidance, closed quote. Because Global-Tech did not alter the conscious avoidance standard, we hold that the District Court's refusal to amend the jury instructions to accord with Global-Tech was

not error.

So, the Second Circuit has within the last couple of weeks resolved all of the issues having to do with conscious avoidance that this defendant would raise on appeal. Given that, he has no substantial issue to raise on appeal. And the government submits that bail should be denied.

THE COURT: Mr. Schwartz.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I apologize to the Court because I have not read the opinion that Mr. Levy has just referred to. But I think that the Court has from time to time reversed on conscious avoidance, and I think it is a very fact-intensive inquiry they make.

What I was suggesting about <u>Global-Tech</u> is particularly where there is not an affirmative act as opposed to an affirmative non-act, and you're seeking from the evidence to have an inference both that the defendant had knowledge of the probability of wrongdoing and that the non-act was an act, it is in that circumstance that a recklessness charge is appropriate.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. SCHWARTZ: No, thank you, your Honor.

MR. LEVY: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

As the government concedes, Mr. Collins is not likely to flee or be a danger to the community. I do find, though,

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that there is a substantial issue for appeal on all of these matters, and accordingly, bail pending appeal will be granted on the same conditions as it is now.

What else?

MR. SCHWARTZ: One more request, your Honor. We would request that in the judgment the Court recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that Mr. Collins serve his time at the federal satellite prison camp in Oxford, Wisconsin, which is just a few hours from Mrs. Collins' home outside of Chicago.

THE COURT: Yes, sir. Anything further?

MR. SCHWARTZ: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Good afternoon. afternoon, sir.

MR. CHERNOFF: I'm sorry, your Honor. The government would just move to dismiss the underlying indictment and open counts.

THE COURT: So ordered.

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